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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of candidates’ personal vote ranks on promotions to political 
power in an open list proportional representation system. Using a regression discontinu-
ity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that ranking first within a party 
enhances a politician’s chances of getting promoted to the position of a municipal board 
chair, the most important task in Finnish local politics. Other ranks matter less. We docu-
ment that the effect of ranking first is larger when there is less within-party competition, 
but the role of external competition is ambiguous. Our evidence suggests that the mech-
anism behind the rank effects is primarily unrelated to electoral incentives but rather to 
party-specific norms or political culture. Ranks seem to be, however, only a complement to 
other promotion criteria such as politicians’ previous political experience or how close to 
the party lines their policy positions stand.
Keywords Open list PR · Political promotions · Preference votes · Rank effects · 
Regression discontinuity design
JEL Classification C21 · D72
1 Introduction
How do political parties select the people who get promoted to leading political positions? 
The answer is not that obvious and political scientists have been referring to political pro-
motions as the “black box” or “secret garden” of politics (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Field 
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and Siavelis 2008; Hazan and Rahat 2010). Promotions to cabinet or party leadership posi-
tions, for example, frequently are considered to be internal matters, and parties may even 
be reluctant to reveal any details to outsiders.
Many countries around the world use electoral systems with open or semi-open lists in 
which a voter can or must express her preference for a particular politician amongst the 
many candidates fielded by a party. Therefore, the outcomes of such elections necessarily 
reflect voter preferences for individual candidates. This paper studies the extent to which 
political parties account for voter preferences in the within-party negotiations for political 
promotions to municipal board and municipal council chairman positions in Finnish local 
governments.1 We analyze the causal effect of intra-party vote ranks on political promo-
tions, and also describe those promotions more broadly. Understanding the links between 
election outcomes and political promotions is crucial in understanding accountability, how 
well voter preferences are reflected in actual policies, and how electoral institutions interact 
with the selection of political leaders when no official rules dictate who becomes a political 
leader.
Our paper provides several extensions to the literature on rank effects in politics (Crisp 
et  al. 2013; Anagol and Fujiwara 2016; Folke et  al. 2016; André et  al. 2017). We also 
contribute to the literature on political selection and the design of electoral systems more 
generally. First, it is interesting to compare both causal (Folke et  al. 2016) and descrip-
tive (Dal Bó et al. 2017) evidence on political promotions in Sweden to our results from 
Finland, as those countries are otherwise very similar, but differ in electoral systems, with 
Sweden having a semi-open and Finland a pure open list system.2 While the effects of vari-
ous electoral systems on political behavior have interested political scientists for a long 
time (Duverger 1954; Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Sartori 1994), comparative evidence on 
the determinants of political promotions is scarce.
We show that the primary effect—i.e., the effect of ranking first in preferential votes on 
the likelihood of political promotions (Folke et al. 2016)—is not present in municipalities 
that are governed by single-party majorities. In other municipalities, (intra-party) election 
winners are around 20% more likely to be promoted to the position of municipal board 
chairman, which is the most important position in Finnish local politics.3 It is interesting 
to observe that parties take individual candidates’ vote ranks (rather than vote shares) into 
account in political promotions. Because our causal findings are based on a regression dis-
continuity design comparing close winners and close runners-up (Lee and Lemieux 2010), 
the results imply that in many cases an arbitrary distinction between the candidates may be 
decisive.
Second, we document three additional novel findings. The effect of ranking first appears 
to be limited by and large to the highest position of board chairman, as we do not find 
a statistically significant primary effect on promotions to council chairman, the second-
most important position in Finnish local politics. Furthermore, we do not find any statisti-
cally significant evidence that the parties nominating both board and council chairs would 
1 Throughout the text, we will refer to the nominations to chairman positions simply as “political promo-
tions”.
2 A semi-open list is otherwise like a closed list, but voters can affect the ranking by voluntary preferential 
votes, which jump the candidate to the top of the list if they account for a large enough share of party votes. 
In a semi-open list, the final ranking is a combination of party and voter choices, whereas in an open list the 
final ranking is decided solely by the voters.
3 The magnitude of the effect is similar to the Swedish findings, although Folke et al. (2016) do not docu-
ment similar heterogeneity in the effects.
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promote second-ranking candidates to council chairs more often than third-ranking candi-
dates. However, the estimates appear to be positive, economically significant and robust in 
magnitude across different specifications. Moreover, we find some weak evidence of lower 
ranks mattering for promotions to council chairmanship.
Third, besides the rank and leadership positions in question, the former may depend on 
other factors. We find that the primary effect is smaller when internal party competition is 
stronger. The results regarding the role of external competition are mixed, although most 
of the evidence supports the argument that the rank effects are larger when the competi-
tion between parties is weaker. We also argue that differences in candidate and leadership 
selection across the political spectrum might influence the primary effect (Duverger 1954; 
Janda and King 1985; Lisi et al. 2015). Accordingly, we find evidence of rank effects for 
the rightwing parties, but not for the leftwing parties. This result is supported by evidence 
from interviews with Finnish party officials. Therefore, party-specific democratic or cul-
tural norms may explain the presence of such effects.
While we do find evidence of the rank effects, the big picture is that ranks seem to have 
roles complementary to other factors, as the effects are present only in some subsamples. 
Our descriptive analysis suggests that parties may especially take the candidates’ policy 
positions and their previous political experience into account in their promotion decisions. 
The latter finding is consistent with the interviews, although the interviewees did not men-
tion policy positions as important determinants of promotions.
2  Literature review
Our study is related to several other research efforts. First, rank-based norms or decision 
rules have been analyzed in various contexts. Some examples documenting such phenom-
ena include Pope (2009), who shows that hospitals that improve their ranking attract more 
patients in the future, and Hartzmark (2015), who studies rank effects in investors’ asset 
trading behavior.
Second, research has shown that rank-based behavior likewise is present in the political 
arena. Anagol and Fujiwara (2016) exploit regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, 
Indian and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, documenting that second-place candi-
dates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to win in subsequent 
elections. More closely related to our work on how parties make decisions are recent stud-
ies by Crisp et al. (2013) and André et al. (2017), who report correlational evidence from 
Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, indicating that in the case of semi-open lists, 
parties reward vote-earning candidates with better future pre-election list positions. Most 
importantly, Folke et al. (2016) show a causal link between winning the preferential vote 
and becoming a party leader in Swedish municipalities with semi-open list systems. They 
label this effect the “primary effect” with the idea that local elections serve the role of pri-
mary elections in subsequent intra-party negotiations.
Third, the principles governing intra-party decisions on political promotions and nomi-
nations also have been the subject of qualitative research. Of particular interest is the Polit-
ical Party Database Project, a recent major survey of party organizations in parliamentary 
and semi-presidential democracies (Poguntke et al. 2016). However, the project focuses on 
national parties and politics and, thus, does not shed light on how local parties behave.
Fourth, our paper also aims to deepen the understanding of how political parties with 
different ideologies vary in terms of the selection rules they use. Such differences can be 
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found in the form of, for example, gender quotas for candidates (Caul 2001), or different 
appointment and voting systems (Rahat and Hazan 2001). Among earlier works, Duver-
ger (1954) and Janda and King (1985), for instance, have argued that leftwing parties are 
more likely to adopt centralized candidate selection processes than right-wing parties are, 
although the origins of such differences are not entirely clear. However, some scholars, 
such as Shomer (2014), find weak or no support for party differences in candidate selection 
procedures. Lisi et al. (2015) use cross-country data over more than half a century to show 
that parties with different ideologies differ in terms of leadership selection methods across 
the world. For instance, leftwing parties more often make their leadership choices within 
party organs than center and rightwing parties do, while center and rightwing parties give 
the power to voters, party members and conference delegates.
Finally, and more broadly speaking, our results contribute to the literature on political 
selection (Besley 2005), in particular, how election systems influence political selection 
(Carey and Shugart 1995; Beath et al. 2016; Braendle 2016) and what personal characteris-
tics are associated with political selection into various offices (Dal Bó et al. 2017).
3  Theoretical discussion and empirical predictions
Political parties across the world use different types of rules when they are deciding whom 
to promote to political power (Poguntke et al. 2016). While Finnish political parties have 
no official rules dictating who must be promoted, interviews we conducted with party offi-
cials suggest that electoral performance is one of the factors that many of the parties con-
sider when determining political promotions. From prior literature (see Sect. 2), we know 
that decision-makers may base their decisions on rank-based norms or informal rules in 
various contexts. Why is that the case? We can summarize in the following four points the 
literature’s central arguments.
First, if votes (or vote ranks) matter when parties decide about nominations and pro-
motions, politicians might have stronger incentives to put more effort into their individual 
campaigns. Such additional effort undoubtedly is desirable from the parties’ perspective. 
Responsiveness to preferences also could be desired by voters (Hopkin 2001; Maravall 
2008), not least because they care about policies for which leader identity could be an 
important determinant (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Jones and Olken 2005). In the 
Finnish municipalities, a decisive case in which being chairman matters for policy is a tied 
vote. The chairman’s vote then breaks the tie (both in the board and the council). Moreo-
ver, the chairmen of municipal boards and councils often are involved in hiring new public 
officials. Public officials are considered to have notable power in Finnish municipalities 
(KAKS 2008). The chairmen can act as political leaders who exploit their high positions 
to achieve partisan goals. They also can act as democratic leaders who try to promote com-
mon goals that have been agreed upon by the majority. In both cases, chairmen could have 
a considerable impact on policy outcomes.
Second, we can draw an analogy to primary elections in which party members or vot-
ers choose the party’s candidate. If voters prefer more transparent nomination procedures 
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006), the party might be able to 
attract more votes if those votes matter beyond the immediate election result. Some voter 
demand for transparent nomination procedures clearly exists in Finnish local politics. For 
instance, a survey conducted by Kunnallisalan Kehittämissäätiö found that around two 
out of three voters said that parties should declare their candidates for important political 
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positions (KAKS 2008). Furthermore, local newspapers usually write about an election’s 
winners and speculate about nominations. Voters tend to be dissatisfied if the most popu-
lar politicians are not given any important positions, which also can be seen in the media. 
Such voter dissatisfaction might pressure local party groups to give their most popular can-
didates important positions in the local government.
Third, if any decision rule exists, votes (or vote ranks) would be a simple and objective 
basis for selection when promotions and nominations are in question.
Fourth, a promotion rule based on vote ranks might be related to internal organization 
of parties or the party culture. For instance, parties might adopt such a promotion rule to 
eliminate middle-rank activists or internal conflicts within the party to achieve stronger 
cohesion (Katz and Mair 1995). Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015) theorize that parties 
introduce primaries when party heterogeneity is too great and parties are in danger of split-
ting into smaller political groups.
Based on the foregoing arguments, we formulate our main hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1 Parties account for candidates’ vote ranks when deciding upon political 
promotions.
According to Finnish party officials, vote ranks are not the only factor in political pro-
motions. The parties often also base their decisions on candidates’ prior political experi-
ence and other competencies. Thus, it is plausible not to expect a one-to-one relationship 
between ranking first, for instance, and being promoted to positions with more political 
power. We provide descriptive analysis on other determinants of political promotions in 
Sect. 5.
One party holds more than half of the seats in roughly every third local council. The 
selection of political leaders may work differently in municipalities governed by single-
party majorities or coalitions. When the largest party has control of over half of the seats, it 
nominates the board chairman almost without exception (see Table A1 in Online Appendix 
A). It is possible that inter-party bargaining affects not only which party gets to nominate 
the leading politicians, but also who these political leaders should be.4 Inter-party bargain-
ing and competition may make party behavior more efficient, which potentially means that 
voters’ views are more likely to be internalized in leadership nominations (Folke et  al. 
2016; Galasso and Nannicini 2011b; De Paola and Scoppa 2011). Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis regarding the difference between municipalities with and without 
absolute majorities and political competition in general:
Hypothesis 2 The rank effects are larger in coalition governments than in absolute sin-
gle-party majorities.
Hypothesis 3 The rank effects are larger when external (between-party) competition is 
more vigorous.
However, the degree of political competition also may have an opposite effect. Hirano 
and Snyder (2014) argue that primary elections were introduced in the United States to 
4 Why municipalities with and without absolute majorities differ from each other also may be related to 
municipality size or strength of party competition. For a comparison, see Table A2 in Online Appendix A.
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promote individual electoral competition within dominant parties in localities where exter-
nal political competition is weak.
Similar ideas likewise apply to internal political competition. It may be that parties in 
Finnish local politics adapt a nomination rule based on vote ranks in order to induce more 
competition within parties when their seats are safe. This leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4 Parties are more likely to use vote ranks as a nomination rule if internal 
(within-party) political competition for council seats is weak.
Previous research (see Sect. 2) has documented potential differences in candidate selec-
tion methods across the political spectrum and, thus, that channel ought not to be neglected 
when analyzing rank effects. If any ideological differences exist, they may extend to leader-
ship selection. For example, parties may differ in their democratic norms and ideologies 
or cultures and consequently may adopt different nomination procedures irrespective of 
how they will be reflected in electoral success. If rightwing parties prefer more inclusive 
nomination procedures—as found elsewhere (Lisi et al. 2015) as well as in the case of local 
Finnish politics—then we should expect to find a larger primary effect for them than for 
leftwing parties. The last hypothesis we postulate and test in this paper is as follows:
Hypothesis 5 The rank effects are larger for candidates from center and rightwing par-
ties than for candidates from leftwing parties.
We interviewed representatives of the eight largest Finnish parties to obtain better 
understanding of potential partisan differences in political promotion patterns. Those dis-
cussions suggest that the differences could indeed arise from different party cultures. For 
instance, the largest leftwing party is explicit in saying that voters cannot affect promotion 
choices, whereas other parties say that votes or even vote ranks matter.
4  Institutional context
4.1  Local politics in Finland
Local governments play an important role in Finland. Decision-making in Finnish munici-
palities is led by local councils, which are responsible for municipal operations and eco-
nomic performance. The council appoints a municipal executive board to take decisions 
and it also can establish committees to deal with specialized governmental functions such 
as social and healthcare services.
Selection into local political positions is a three-stage process. The first step is open list 
voting in elections, the second step involves post-election negotiations between parties, and 
the third step comprises within-party decisions about which individuals are assigned to the 
governing positions allocated to each party. This paper focuses on the third step.
Municipal councils are elected every fourth year. Finland operates an open list electoral 
system in which voters cast their votes directly for a single candidate. Voters cannot vote 
for a party separately from a candidate, but votes also count as votes for the party list to 
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which the candidate belongs.5 Hence, a vote affects the number of seats a party list can 
obtain and also ranks the candidate within the party list. Seats on the municipal council are 
allocated using the D’Hondt method; the total number of seats, varying between 13 and 
85, depends on the town’s population. Moreover, seats within political parties are allocated 
based on candidates’ total votes. The municipal elections held between 2000 and 2012 
were dominated by three large parties from the political left, center and right, namely, the 
Social Democratic Party, the Center Party and the National Coalition Party.
4.2  Rules regarding political promotions
What is left undecided after the voters cast their ballots is who is promoted to political 
power in the local government. After the local elections are held, the parties bargain with 
each other about how to divide the seats on the municipal board and on various commit-
tees. Moreover, the parties need to agree on how to share chairmanship positions on the 
local council, municipal board and committees. The position of municipal board chairman, 
comparable to a mayor in many other countries, is considered to be the most important post 
in local politics, while the council chairman is second most important position.6 In most 
cases, the largest party gets to nominate the board chairman and the remaining positions 
are shared between parties that hold local council seats.7 After the parties have agreed on 
how the important positions in local governance are distributed amongst them, they have to 
decide whom to nominate to those positions. A majority of the local council members must 
approve all nominations, but the council typically follows a “gentlemen’s agreement” and 
respects both the intra-party bargaining result and the within-party choices.
Interviews with party officials of the eight largest Finnish parties suggest a large vari-
ance in the nomination principles across the parties and even within parties across munici-
palities; the national party organizations rarely impose any restrictions on promotion deci-
sion in local politics. However, half of the parties have adopted national guidelines. We 
summarize the findings of these interviews in Table 1.
Political promotion decisions are made in practice by both the local party organization 
(involving party members) and the party’s elected councilors. Importantly, the promotion 
decisions are not in the hands of individual powerful local political leaders. Typically, the 
decisions are influenced by politicians’ electoral performances and competencies, but some 
parties also consider candidates’ prior political experience and gender. Two parties men-
tioned that either some or many municipalities use an explicit rank rule whereby the one 
with most votes has first pick of the positions allocated to the party, the second-ranked gets 
5 Each candidate is assigned a candidate number that the voter writes on the ballot. Official lists of candi-
dates, their numbers and occupations, ordered by party affiliation, are shown to voters in the voting booth 
and often published in local newspapers. The order of the parties on these lists is decided by lottery and 
candidates are listed alphabetically within the party lists.
6 In a survey conducted in 1996, 74% of local politicians who responded said that the chairmanship of the 
municipal board is the most desirable position. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the respondents said that 
the board chairman has more political power than the council chairman (Sinisalmi 1999).
7 Given that the important positions in the local government are distributed proportionally to parties’ seat 
shares and decided by the council, parties sometimes form alliances to increase their bargaining and voting 
powers (see instructions provided to the municipalities by the Finnish Association of Local Authorities, 
available online at https ://www.kunta liitt o.fi/yleis kirje et/2012/kunna nhall ituks en-lauta kunti en-ja-muide 
n-toimi elint en-valin nat; Accessed April 3, 2018). Alliances supply one reason why the largest party does 
not always get the most important chairmanship.
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the second pick, and so forth. Four other parties mention that votes influence promotion 
decisions, but did not mention having a rank-based rule. Two parties do not mention votes 
mattering at all. Interestingly, the largest leftwing party (the Social Democratic Party) is 
explicit in saying that voters cannot affect political promotion decisions.
5  Data and preliminary analysis
This paper combines municipal election data from the Finnish Ministry of Justice and 
information on various politicians’ local government positions collected by the Associa-
tion of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto 2013). These data are available 
for four elections between 2000 and 2012 and the respective electoral terms. The data are 
further merged with data on municipal employee status from KEVA, income data from the 
Finnish Tax Administration and socioeconomic characteristics from Statistics Finland.
Three further aspects of the data should be mentioned. First, we omit two municipali-
ties in 2004, as mistakes are evident in their election results. Second, the chairmen are 
observed at the beginning of each electoral term and some unobserved changes are pos-
sible during their 4-year terms in office. For example, parties could agree that a chairman’s 
term is shorter than 4 years and that another person will take his place at some point. Third, 
chairmen of the municipal boards need not be elected politicians.8 We identify 42 such 
board chairmen in our sample. As they did not participate in elections, we cannot include 
them in our empirical analysis.
In the main parts of our empirical analysis of rank effects, we enter data only for candi-
dates who rank nth and (n + 1)th. In a few cases, two (or more) candidates tie in votes and 
have the same vote rank. We drop such party lists from the sample. We concentrate on the 
party lists that get to nominate the chairman because the other cases exhibit no variation 
of interest in the outcome variable. We are interested only in the within-party decisions on 
who to promote rather than on the between-party allocations of chair positions; thus, the 
population parameter of interest refers only to the lists that get the chair position.
Table B1 in Online Appendix B provides descriptive comparisons between the winners 
and runners-up, i.e., the sample used in our main empirical analysis. We notice immedi-
ately that the most popular candidates are more likely to obtain important positions in local 
government than runners-up, but at the same time, they differ along many other dimensions 
as well. For example, they are more successful in the elections as measured by numbers of 
votes and vote shares and also more likely to be incumbents, have university educations, 
have larger earnings and higher socioeconomic status. Such differences indicate that win-
ners could be more competent than runners-up and, hence, more likely to get promoted to 
top positions for reasons other than their ranks or electoral performances more generally. It 
is, therefore, likely that they will differ also in many relevant unobservable characteristics, 
thus calling for a valid research design if we are interested in the causal effect of rank on 
political promotions.
How do political leaders look compared to other politicians? We turn to that ques-
tion in Table 2. We show means of various characteristics for four different groups: board 
chairmen, party list winners, all elected candidates and all candidates. To facilitate the 
8 The legislation allows this as the municipal boards are appointed by the council and not elected by the 
voters (unlike the municipal councils).
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comparison, the latter three groups exclude the board chairs and include only the party lists 
that got to nominate the board chairman. Note, especially, that the comparison between 
board chairman and first-ranking politicians provides us with an interesting window for 
comparing voters’ and parties’ preferences for politicians.
Several interesting observations arise from those analyses. First, and important for our 
study, vote rank appears to be (positively) related to becoming a board chairman. That is, 
however, far from the only dimension along which board chairmen differ. Second, another 
crucial distinction is that board chairmen are on average more experienced, based on 
incumbency status, previous leadership experience and age, than candidates in any other 
group. Third, the chairmen earn more, are less often unemployed and have higher educa-
tional attainment than other elected or all candidates. Those comparisons suggest some 
positive selection into power based on their level of competence to the extent these met-
rics indicate competence. However, they are less competent than the most popular candi-
dates. Fourth, the share of women among the chairs is much lower than among the election 
winners, hinting at some possible gender bias in promotions.9 Finally, the Finnish parties 
nominate reliable party leaders whose policy preferences are closer to party averages than 
those of the other elected politicians, all candidates or the list winners.10 These findings 
are broadly in line with the theoretical arguments of, for example, Crisp et al. (2013) and 
Tavits (2009)—candidates who accumulate many personal votes are often party outsiders 
who may disrupt party unity, that is, parties face tradeoffs between popularity and policy 
cohesion. Bäck et al. (2016) also report related findings. In particular, they show that cabi-
net ministers are appointed with the aim of minimizing policy distance to the most impor-
tant political actors.
The findings from the simple mean comparisons largely are corroborated by regression 
results reported in Online Appendix Tables B2–B4, where we regress a dummy variable 
for board or council chairmanships on rank dummies and a set of other covariates. Consist-
ent with the idea of vote ranks mattering for political promotions, a higher rank and more 
votes increase politicians’ likelihood of being promoted. Based on that analysis, we would 
reach conclusions similar to Crisp et al. (2013) and André et al. (2017), namely that all the 
top ranks matter for political promotions, even after controlling for a rich set of observable 
characteristics.
To summarize, it seems that parties prefer experience and cohesiveness more than vot-
ers, whereas voters have slightly stronger preferences for other metrics, especially compe-
tence. Nonetheless, our findings hint that Finnish parties do fairly well in promoting more 
competent politicians to important positions in the local government. The findings also 
align with the interviews we conducted with Finnish party officials, according to whom 
promotion decisions are based mainly on three factors: electoral performance, political 
experience and other competencies.
More broadly, our descriptive analysis relates to a recent paper by Dal Bó et al. (2017), 
who study how Swedish local politicians, including political leaders, compare to the popu-
lations they represent. They find that local Swedish politicians are on average significantly 
smarter and are better leaders than the people they represent, measured by test scores on 
military cognitive and leadership tests. Similarly, leading politicians appear to be more 
competent than other politicians. The main difference between Finland and Sweden is that 
in the former voters have more say on who gets elected, while in the latter parties’ role 
9 See also Folke and Rickne (2016), who analyze the glass ceiling in politics.
10 For detailed description of how these policy indices are constructed, we refer to Online Appendix B.
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is more pronounced. Despite these differences, both political systems seem to be able to 
select elected politician and party leaders who are competent. That conclusion is one indi-
cation that semi-open and open lists can be fairly similar in their selection of party leaders.
6  Empirical strategy
Simply regressing the outcome, becoming the chairman of a municipal board, on a candi-
date’s vote rank within his party list tells us only something about the correlation between 
those variables. One central concern is the omission of politicians’ characteristics that 
bias the estimates to an unknown degree and direction. For instance, more able politicians 
might attract more votes and rank high in election results, but they also could be more 
likely to receive top positions because of their skills. Such characteristics might be observ-
able to the voter, but not to the econometrician. In order to overcome endogeneity issues 
in estimating the impact of vote rank on political promotions, we will adopt a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) approach.
In the regression discontinuity design (RDD), we compare two candidates with different 
vote ranks but (almost) the same number of votes, who also are likely to be similar in their 
characteristics, by estimating regression functions of the form
where Yit is the outcome of interest, vit is the forcing variable measuring the distance from 
the threshold between two ranks, 1{vit> 0} is an indicator for ranking first and β is the coef-
ficient of interest. If f(vit) is approximately correctly specified within a given bandwidth, 
and no precise manipulation of the forcing variable is observed (i.e., the density is smooth 
at the threshold), the covariates should evolve smoothly at the boundary and, thus, 𝛽  will 
be the causal estimate of the primary effect.
As advised in recent work (Gelman and Imbens 2017), we will execute the design using 
low-order local polynomial specifications. Our implementation closely follows Hyytinen 
et al. (2017), who evaluate different implementations of regression discontinuity designs 
in a close election setting by comparing RDD results with the results from actual rand-
omizations that happen when two (or more) candidates tie for the last seat in Finnish local 
elections. More specifically, we use local linear and quadratic polynomials estimated 
separately on both sides of the cutoff. In our benchmark specifications, we employ MSE-
optimal bandwidths, but we also verify robustness to alternative bandwidths.11 Finally, we 
also estimate RDD with bias correction and robust inference, as suggested by Calonico 
et al. (2014). We fix the main and bias bandwidths to be the same following Calonico et al. 
(2018), who argue that that is an optimal choice. All local regressions use a triangular 
kernel.
We use the relative vote margin as the forcing variable. For the primary effect regres-
sions, for instance, this is defined as the vote distance of winner (runner-up) from runner-
up (winner) divided by the total number of their votes. Doing so means that the threshold 
between two ranks is set at zero.
Finally, it is not obvious that we will be able to capture any rank effects using RDD 
that identify a local effect at the threshold where both candidates are equally popular. 
(1)Yit = 𝛼 + 𝛽ퟏ
{
vit > 0
}
+ f
(
vit
)
+ 𝜀it,
11 Bandwidths are computed using rdrobust software in Stata (Calonico et al. 2016).
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Employing such an empirical strategy necessarily implies that we can identify only the 
direct and independent effect of vote ranks. The rank effect estimated in that way, if pre-
sent, requires that rank has relevance up to and above the vote count. Some theories dis-
cussed in Sect. 2 do not make a clear distinction between votes and vote ranks. Vote ranks 
could be more important, for example, if they are more salient indicators of success in 
elections or voters attach some special value to winning. Previous research has argued that 
political parties in party-centered environments have incentives to place popular persons 
high on their electoral lists to maximize their electoral performances (Shugart et al. 2005). 
Folke et al. (2016) argue that the same logic also should hold for promotions to top posi-
tions. Unfortunately, the RDD setting does not allow studying the role of popularity per se. 
Future work should aim to find alternative strategies for evaluating that aspect.
7  Primary effect on political nominations
7.1  Main results
To give an overall picture of the data, we plot global polynomials over (almost) the whole 
range of the running variable.12 Figure 1 provides such a graph for the primary effect on 
promotions to board chairman. It appears that a positive effect of ranking first on being 
promoted exists, and that the effect comes from municipalities not governed by absolute 
majorities. Therefore, our results lend support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Next, we turn to more detailed regression analysis. In Table 3, we report the estimation 
results for the primary effect on promotion to board chairman. Column (1) reports the OLS 
estimates, which do not have a causal interpretation; in columns (2)–(6), we show various 
RDD results. While the estimates in Panel A are robust across different specifications (dif-
ferent bandwidths and polynomials), they lack statistical significance. That finding turns 
out to be explained by the fact that the estimates of the primary effect are close to zero in 
municipalities where the nominating party has an absolute majority (Panel B). Once we 
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Fig. 1  Primary effect on promotions to board chairman. a Full sample, b Absolute majority in municipality, 
c No absolute majority in municipality
12 We use a data-driven approach to choose the bins (see Calonico et al. 2015). More specifically, we use 
evenly spaced bins that mimic the variance in the data.
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restrict our attention to councils without any absolute majorities (Panel C), we find that the 
first-ranking candidates are about 13–24% points more likely to become board chairmen 
than the runners-up Thus, ranking first versus second roughly doubles the chances of get-
ting a political promotion. These findings support Hypotheses 1 and 2.
In order to evaluate whether the effects estimated for the different subsamples also are 
statistically distinguishable from one another, we conduct t tests on whether the coefficients 
for different subsamples are equal. For four out of the five RDD specifications estimat-
ing the primary effect, the difference is statistically significant, but only at the 10% level. 
Nonetheless, we interpret the evidence as implying a different effect across the subsamples.
Folke et al. (2016) find that in Sweden, 30% of close runners-up become local political 
leaders—they are the people most likely to be promoted to mayor if their party gets to fill the 
Table 3  Estimates of the primary effect on promotions to board chairman
The outcome is becoming municipal board chairman. The sample includes winners and runners-up from the 
party nominating the board’s chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brack-
ets; p value refers to testing the difference of the estimates in Panels B and C
*,** and ***Denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
Panel A: Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary effect 0.187***
[0.020]
0.105
[0.069]
0.075
[0.049]
0.107
[0.091]
0.091
[0.062]
0.107*
[0.065]
 N 2704 772 1388 1022 1730 1388
 R2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
 Bandwidth 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.12
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Primary effect 0.074**
[0.030]
− 0.023
[0.095]
− 0.031
[0.066]
− 0.031
[0.131]
− 0.040
[0.092]
− 0.023
[0.095]
 N 1030 292 542 344 644 542
 R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
 Bandwidth 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.10
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Primary effect 0.257***
[0.027]
0.214**
[0.095]
0.132*
[0.069]
0.238*
[0.130]
0.187**
[0.091]
0.212**
[0.084]
 N 1674 546 940 650 1084 940
 R2 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
 Bandwidth 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.15
p value for difference 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.06
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear 
(bias-cor-
rected)
Bandwidth 0.5 * MSE(1) MSE(1) 0.5 * MSE(2) MSE(2) MSE(1)
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position at the next election—while the respective share is 60% for close winners. While the 
baseline probabilities are larger than what we find in Finnish local councils, the overall effect 
is very similar in both cases. The similarity of the effect is striking in two ways. First, some 
political scientists have claimed that semi-open list systems are, in fact, merely closed lists in 
disguise because voters tend to cast their votes for the candidates placed on top of the list (Far-
rell 2001; Mueller 2005; Andeweg 2005). However, we find very similar primary effects in 
the Finnish political context where open lists are used. Second, preferential votes might play a 
different role in semi-open list elections and open list elections. Our results suggest that that is 
not the case, either. The result is an important one because electoral rules typically are under-
stood to have substantial influence on political selection in general (Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Myerson 1999; Besley 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Galasso and Nannicini 2011a, 2015, 2017).
We report and discuss a rigorous set of validity and robustness checks in Online Appendix 
C. Those checks support the validity of the empirical design and the robustness of the results 
that we find.
7.2  Are parties avoiding voter punishment or following norms?
We also aim to shed some light on the mechanism through which the rank effects operate. 
One mechanism that we can test for is that parties might promote winners to political power 
because they fear that voters would punish them for not doing so. In order to see if that is the 
case, we estimate the association between not nominating the winner as board chairman after 
election t and the change in the nominating party’s vote share between elections held in t and 
t + 1 (measured in percentage points), controlling for municipality, year and party fixed effects. 
We do not find that the voters would punish the parties if the winner does not get promoted 
(see Table D1 in Online Appendix D), meaning that the primary effect is not likely to arise 
from parties’ vote-seeking behavior. Therefore, it is more plausible to conclude that some kind 
of democratic norms underlie the rank effects.
7.3  Further rank effects
In Online Appendices D and E, we report an extensive collection of additional rank effect 
results. First, in Online Appendix D, we explore the effects of lower ranks on promotions 
to board chairman. No rank effects other than those reported previously are found. Online 
Appendix E reports the results of analyses similar to those we have seen already, but instead of 
studying promotions to the chairman of a municipal board, our outcome of interest is becom-
ing the chairman of a municipal council, which is the second most important local political 
position. We find some evidence of lower ranks mattering for promotions to council chairman. 
In particular, it appears that ranking 2nd instead of 3rd and 3rd instead of 4th makes pro-
motion more likely. However, those effects—as in the main text—are present only in certain 
subsamples.
Taken together, our results suggest that the role of vote ranks is rather limited and not as 
strong as our descriptive analysis would suggest. Furthermore, our results provide a word of 
caution on what can be learned about rank effects from correlational analysis, such as those 
presented by Crisp et al. (2013) and André et al. (2017).
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8  Role of political competition and ideology
8.1  Testing hypotheses 3 and 4
We next turn to a deeper analysis of the role of political competition. Hypotheses 3 and 
4 suggest that the rank effect may depend on the degree of political competition, but it is 
ambiguous as to how those interact with each other. The difference between single-party 
and coalition-governed local governments provides some support for Hypothesis 3, but fur-
ther analysis is in order. Folke et al. (2016) provide some empirical evidence for the pri-
mary effect being larger in Sweden when political competition is stronger, although they do 
not distinguish clearly between internal (with-party) and external (between-party) competi-
tion. However, internal and external competition may have different implications for rank 
effects. We employ direct measures of external and internal competition: party seat share 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index, computed as the sum of squared seat shares, and vote margin 
within a party for the last seat it receives, respectively.13
In the interest of space, we will concentrate on the subsample without absolute majori-
ties and split the remaining sample in two on the basis of the median values of the com-
petition measures. Another rationale for excluding absolute majorities is that the nature 
of inter-party competition differs widely across such municipalities, which might con-
found our results. Moreover, not much variation exists along the between-party dimension 
amongst the absolute majority group. We stress that we cannot provide a causal interpre-
tation as to why the results may differ across the subsamples as we are conditioning on 
potentially endogenous factors (Fig. 2). 
We plot RDD figures for the primary effect in Fig. 3 under four different circumstances: 
high or low, external or internal competition. The graphs show global quartic polynomials 
and binned averages. The primary effect appears to be larger when both external and inter-
nal competition are weak. That result contradicts Hypothesis 3, but tallies with Hypothesis 
4. The findings also align with Hirano and Snyder (2014), who argue that primaries were 
introduced in the United States to promote individual electoral competition within domi-
nant parties in localities where political competition is weak. Hence, it may be that parties 
in local Finnish politics adapt a nomination rule based on vote ranks in order to induce 
more intra-party competition. However, the coefficients generally are not statistically sig-
nificantly different across the subsamples and, thus, we cannot draw strong conclusions 
from the results (Table 4). We assess the robustness of the results in Online Appendix F.
We do not find any rank effects in municipalities governed by absolute majorities when 
the sample is split in two above and below the competition median. Similarly, we do 
not find rank effects when we use the full sample divided in two by median competition 
(results not reported).
13 We also explored alternative competition measures, i.e., a party’s distance from obtaining an absolute 
majority (external competition) and the ratio of candidates per seats obtained (internal competition). Our 
findings are robust to using those alternative measures of competition. Note also that our measure of inter-
nal competition gauges overall competition within a party rather than competition for the top position. That 
measure is particularly suitable for testing Hypothesis 4.
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Fig. 2  RDD graph, primary effect by competition. a External competition, b Internal competition
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Fig. 3  RDD graph, primary effect by ideology. a Rightwing parties, b Leftwing parties
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8.2  Testing hypothesis 5
Our final hypothesis is that party ideologies matter for the rank effects. To examine whether 
that is the case, we group the political parties into two blocs and estimate the primary effect 
for those subsamples. The division between left and right is not strikingly sharp in Finnish 
Table 4  Primary effect by competition
The outcome is being chairman of municipal board. Sample includes winners and runners-up from the 
party nominating the chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets
*,** and ***Denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
Panel A: External competition
High competition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Primary effect 0.286***
[0.038]
0.175
[0.145]
0.029
[0.105]
0.213
[0.169]
0.018
[0.119]
0.154
[0.126]
 N 838 220 384 322 556 384
 R2 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
 Bandwidth 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.13
Low competition (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Primary effect 0.227*** 0.199 0.280** 0.169 0.319** 0.321***
[0.037] [0.177] [0.118] [0.218] [0.143] [0.117]
 N 836 194 358 294 500 358
 R2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04
 Bandwidth 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.09
p value for differ-
ence
0.92 0.11 0.87 0.11 0.33
Panel B: Internal competition
High competition (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
 Primary effect 0.249***
[0.038]
0.100
[0.115]
0.095
[0.090]
0.144
[0.157]
0.094
[0.118]
0.101
[0.104]
 N 836 328 546 350 570 546
 R2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
 Bandwidth 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.20
Low competition (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Primary effect 0.265***
[0.037]
0.316**
[0.158]
0.224**
[0.113]
0.188
[0.220]
0.343**
[0.153]
0.357**
[0.143]
N 838 226 406 268 464 546
R2 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04
Bandwidth 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12
p value for differ-
ence
0.27 0.37 0.87 0.20 0.15
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear (bias-
corrected)
Bandwidth 0.5 * MSE(1) MSE(1) 0.5 * MSE(2) MSE(2) MSE(1)
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politics, especially at the local level, but we can provide at least a crude classification based 
on the bourgeois versus socialist origins of the parties. The parties we assign to the right-
wing bloc are the Center Party, the National Coalition Party, True Finns, the Swedish Party 
and the Christian Democratic Party; the parties assigned to the leftwing bloc are the Social 
Democratic Party and Left Alliance.14 Again, we concentrate on municipalities in which 
no absolute majority is in power. That choice is natural for facilitating comparison with the 
results in the previous sections and for the reasons discussed there, but also because almost 
all of the absolute majority parties would be classified as rightwing.
Figure 3 shows RDD graphs for the primary effect, plotting global quartic polynomials 
and binned averages. The results for the primary effect provide clear support for Hypothesis 
5. We provide further support in Table 5. For the rightwing parties (Panel A), we estimate 
a statistically significant primary effect of 20–30% on promotions to board seats, while the 
estimates for leftwing parties (Panel B) mostly are smaller, less robust and not statistically 
significant. One caveat, however, is that the number of observations is limited for leftwing 
Table 5  Primary effect by party ideology
The outcome is being chairman of municipal board. Sample includes winners and runners-up from the 
party nominating the chair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in brackets
*,** and ***Denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
Panel A: Rightwing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Primary effect 0.240***
[0.031]
0.282**
[0.122]
0.173**
[0.084]
0.310*
[0.174]
0.238**
[0.115]
0.282***
[0.106]
 N 1268 432 738 512 852 738
 R2 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
 Bandwidth 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.16
Panel B: Leftwing parties
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 Primary effect 0.333***
[0.052]
0.158
[0.140]
0.072
[0.137]
0.244
[0.177]
0.116
[0.150]
0.172
[0.137]
 N 390 102 166 118 214 166
 R2 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05
 Bandwidth 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.13
p value for difference 0.50 0.53 0.79 0.52 0.53
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear 
(bias-cor-
rected)
Bandwidth 0.5 * MSE(1) MSE(1) 0.5 * MSE(2) MSE(2) MSE(1)
14 The results are very similar if we instead divide the parties based on their interview responses (Table 1) 
relating to whether votes matter for promotions, such that the Social Democratic Party and the True Finns 
are in one bloc and the other parties constitute the second bloc. The robustness of the results is explained 
easily because the alternative classification does not change the ideological classifications of the three larg-
est parties which drive the results.
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parties and our findings could be explained by the small sample size. We cannot distinguish 
the estimates statistically from each other for any of the specifications. Moreover, if we 
include absolute majorities in the estimations, the differences between the political blocs 
vanish. Additional robustness checks reported in Online Appendix F support the findings.
One potential explanation for the differences in the estimated magnitudes and statistical 
significances across parties, assuming that they are not just noise, could be that some of the 
parties could be more policy-oriented and, thus, more likely to choose leaders whose politi-
cal standing is closer to party ideology, whereas other parties might behave opportunisti-
cally and be more prone to cater to voter preferences. In Online Appendix F, we show that 
this is not the case. While parties are more likely to promote politicians with policy stances 
closer to party medians, no differences between rightwing and leftwing parties along those 
lines are evident. Therefore, the fact that the primary effects are larger in magnitude and 
statistical significance for the rightwing parties is consistent with some party-specific 
democratic or cultural norms explaining the rank effects (Janda and King 1985; Lisi et al. 
2015). Our interview results are consistent with that interpretation.
9  Conclusions
This paper explores vote ranks as a determinant of political promotions. While the effects 
of various electoral systems have long attracted the interest of political scientists (Duverger 
1954; Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Sartori 1994), the idea of interaction between the dis-
tribution of votes and political appointments recently advocated by Folke et al. (2016) is 
rather new. We find evidence of the primary effect—i.e., the effect of ranking first in pref-
erential votes within a party—in promotions to chairman of local Finnish municipal boards 
and some weaker evidence of lower ranks mattering for promotions to the post of council 
chairman. Moreover, we show that the primary effect differs in the degree of political com-
petition and ideologies of parties.
Because the vote rank is accounted for in the political promotions in only some subsam-
ples, rank is at best complementary to other considerations that parties have in selecting 
leaders. Our descriptive analysis suggests that politicians’ previous political experience and 
policy positions may play an important role in political promotions.
Our theoretical arguments are general. Thus, they may apply in other electoral contexts 
or other types of political promotion. It also is plausible that similar empirical patterns 
could emerge elsewhere. Many countries around the world, such as Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Spain and Sweden, use open or 
semi-open lists in at least some of their elections. Furthermore, in many of those countries, 
local political leaders such as mayors are not elected, but rather appointed from the pool of 
local councilors. Preferential votes likewise might matter at other levels of government. For 
instance, the candidates who obtain the most votes in Finnish parliamentary elections—
“vote rakes” (ääniharava), as they are called in Finnish—often are front-runners when it 
comes to distributing cabinet positions. Descriptive evidence from a variety of countries 
(Crisp et  al. 2013; André et  al. 2017) suggests that much like Finland, the political par-
ties in political systems with preferential voting often choose their vote pullers for political 
promotion. To what extent such procedures reflect vote ranks and not some other charac-
teristics correlated with electoral success is an empirical question that should be explored 
further in future research.
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The results of this paper arguably are important from the voters’ perspective, as it 
appears that, under certain circumstances, their votes matter beyond the direct electoral 
outcomes of their choice on Election Day. Moreover, leading politicians’ competencies and 
qualifications may matter for actual policy outcomes or economic performance (Chatto-
padhyay and Duflo 2004; Jones and Olken 2005). While evaluating the link between selec-
tion of political leaders and policy outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, it nonethe-
less is important to understand how leaders are chosen when no explicit rules governing 
the selection process are in place.
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